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AFFILIATION TO A NEW CUSTOMARY LAW IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH 
AFRICA 
ES Nwauche 
1 Introduction 
This article examines the possibility of the acquisition of customary law in post-
apartheid South Africa. Its central argument is that a national civic citizenship 
entitles South Africans to sub-national cultural identities, which entails being bound 
by the normative framework of a community of their choice. Even though 
"customary law" has acquired a technical meaning - as demonstrated below - as the 
normative framework of "black" communities, this article chooses to define it as 
representing in addition the norms regarded as obligatory by all cultural, religious 
and linguistic communities, the existence of which is recognised by section 31 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.1 At the heart of this paper is the 
evaluation of the possibilities opened up by section 30 of the Constitution, which 
states that every person has a right to participate in the culture of his or her choice. 
Since customary law is an expression of the culture of communities and is 
understood as the usages, practices, beliefs, values and institutions of a community,2 
it would seem possible that the Constitution enables every person to subscribe to the 
customary law of his or her choice. It is further argued that the realisation of the 
possibility of changing to a new customary law would be crucial to national 
development, because it would foster a sense of national inclusiveness. This article 
                                                          
 Aspects of this paper were presented first at Panel SE01 at the 17th World Congress of the 
International Union of Anthropological and Ethnobiological Sciences (IUAES 2013) held at the 
University of Manchester 5-10 August 2013 and secondly at the Sixth Private Law and Social 
Justice Conference held at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Port Elizabeth 18-19 
August 2014. The author acknowledges support from the University of Botswana Research Grant 
and the Rhodes University Research Grant towards the production of this paper. 
  Evance S Nwauche. LLB LLM (Nigeria). Professor of Law, Rhodes University, Grahamstown. E-
mail: e.nwauche@ru.ac.za. 
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution). 
2 See the following definitions: Spencer-Oatey Culturally Speaking 3: "Culture is a fuzzy set of 
basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioral 
conventions that are shared by a group of people, and that influence (but do not determine) 
each member's behavior and his/her interpretations of the 'meaning' of other people's behavior"; 
Matsumoto Culture and Psychology 16: "…the set of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors 
shared by a group of people, but different for each individual, communicated from one 
generation to the next". 
ES NWAUCHE   PER / PELJ 2015(18)3 
 
570 
 
argues that the possibility affirms the dignity of all South Africans and would 
significantly enhance the vision of a truly non-racial society envisaged by the 
Constitution, thus contributing to the development of a just society. On the other 
hand if it were not possible for people to make such choices, this could result in the 
hardening of identities and the emergence of different classes of South African 
citizenship. 
At present reality it is generally assumed that South Africans cannot submit 
themselves to a customary law of their choice, because it is widely assumed that 
only blacks in South Africa are entitled to follow customary law, as defined by their 
ethnicity and therefore by blood descent. Thus, for black South Africans their birth 
defines their ethnicity or tribal affiliation and therefore their customary law, which 
follows them through life. Accordingly it would appear to be a difficult proposition 
that black South Africans could change their customary law. Thus a Zulu who desires 
expressly or by implication to be bound by Sotho customary law could be faced with 
considerable difficulties despite the promise of section 30 of the Constitution. It 
would appear to be even more difficult for "white" and "coloured" South Africans, 
who are not entitled to customary law, according to conventional wisdom, to choose 
a customary law. 
The motivation for this article is partly traceable to the Pretoria High Court decision 
in Chinese Association of South Africa v Minister of Labour,3 in which the Chinese 
Association of South Africa sought an order in the main declaring South African 
Chinese people as falling within the ambit of the definition of "Black People" in 
section 1 of the Employment Equity Act (EEA) 55 of 1998 as well as section 1 of the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEEA) 53 of 2003. The 
applicants sought in the alternative that this legislation should be declared 
unconstitutional if Chinese people are excluded from the definition of "Black People". 
The court's judgment declared Chinese people to be black in terms of the EEA and 
the BBBEEA. One of the interesting things about this decision is that it was 
welcomed by the South African Chinese community, who were content to be black if 
                                                          
3 Chinese Association of South Africa v Minister of Labour (PHC) unreported case no 59521/2007 
of 18 June 2008 (hereafter referred to as Chinese Association). 
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this meant the success of their long struggle to be recognised by the South African 
legal and political establishment as entitled to the benefits of the black 
empowerment scheme.4 On the other hand, sections of the black community 
severely criticised this decision and declared that a Chinese person cannot 
conceivably be a black person.5 While a Chinese person has significantly different 
physical characteristics from a black person, to regard them as the same would 
suggest that race is a legal and social construction rather than a matter of genetics. 
Such a thought would seem to be supported by the definition of "Black" in section 1 
of the EEA, which defines "black people" as meaning "Africans, Coloureds and 
Indians", suggesting that the definition is generic rather than genetic.6 Important as 
the administrative classifications of racial categories remain for South Africa,7 this 
article is not directly concerned with these issues but follows another tack, to 
determine whether a South African Chinese person and any other non-black person 
could choose to subscribe to Zulu, Xhosa or Sotho customary law in the light of the 
judicial recognition of their "blackness". It is submitted that they can in terms of 
section 30 of the Constitution, but not in terms of certain statutes considered in 
section 5 of this article. The nature of cultural relations is such that South Africans 
are indeed actively engaged in choosing new customary laws as envisaged by 
section 30 of the Constitution. It is therefore incumbent on the legal system to 
recognise the promise of the Constitution. 
This article is organised as follows. The next section considers the relationship 
between citizenship and sub-national identities in a plural state as the basis of the 
promise of section 30 of the Constitution. In part three the article considers the 
concept of communities and the normative frameworks that can be described as 
customary law. Part four examines the acquisition and change of customary law in 
South Africa, while part five uses the examples of customary marriages and 
                                                          
4 See for example Erasmus and Stone 2008 China Monitor 4. 
5 See for example APO 2008 http://www.appablog.wordpress.com/2008/07/02/south-africa-
communique-by-black-organisations-pretoria-high-court-judgment-status-of-Chinese-south-
africans/. 
6 See Erasmus and Stone 2008 China Monitor 4. 
7 See for example McGregor 2011 De Jure 111. 
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customary succession to illustrate the implications of the acquisition and change of 
customary law. 
2 Citizenship and sub-national identities in a plural state 
It is generally agreed that citizenship has three meanings - as a matter of legal 
status; as an entitlement to the participation in legal communities; and as 
membership in a political community.8 The legal conception of citizenship as 
connecting an individual to a state and determining the rights and duties of that 
individual to the state encompasses these three meanings.9 One of the challenges of 
citizenship is that it is egalitarian and imagines all citizens as equal before the law.10 
The notion of equality and non-discrimination is thought to strengthen the bonds of 
loyalty towards the state and the sense of belonging and identity of individuals. 
Important as that is, the reality is that the citizens of a state are often diverse in a 
range of ways, such as in their religion, language geographical circumstances and 
the different communities that they belong to.11 It is true that when individuals 
interact with their environment, they create and recreate social facts which reflect 
their resolutions of the different challenges they face. The notion of culture 
represents our understanding of the discernible and often concrete manifestations of 
how citizens interact with their environment. Thus, when individuals manifest their 
belief in a metaphysical being, we recognise that belief as a religion or a belief 
system or opinion. The same goes for how citizens are born, die, eat, live, marry, 
buy property, raise children, build their houses or conserve common resources. One 
medium through which citizens interact with their environment is through the 
different communities which they are born into, join and exit as they negotiate their 
life journey. It is mainly through their shared understandings of values, myths, 
processes and prescriptions that members of communities bring order to their lives. 
The recognition of how citizens interact with their communities is therefore an 
                                                          
8 See for example Kymlicka and Norman 1994 Ethics 352-381; Cohen 1999 International Sociology 
245-268. 
9 See for example s 3 of the Constitution: "(1) There is a common South African citizenship. (2) All 
citizens are (a) equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship; and (b) 
equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship." 
10 See generally Marshall Citizenship and Social Class. 
11 See generally Parekh Rethinking Multiculturalism 336; Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship. 
ES NWAUCHE   PER / PELJ 2015(18)3 
 
573 
 
important means of recognising the cultural identities of citizens and reflects the 
personal choices they make. Cultural identities ensure that citizens are not 
homogenized, even if they are equal in the eyes of the law. 
A number of important conclusions are evident in this short overview. The first is 
that culture is a social fact and changes to reflect how individuals interact with their 
environment. Immutability is therefore not a fundamental attribute of culture, in that 
the longevity of an understanding or a process is not a defining feature of culture. 
Secondly, the sense of community implies that it can be organised around different 
social facts, and no social fact is inherently superior to any other. Allied to this point, 
therefore, is the need to understand that communities change and cannot, therefore, 
be considered to be static. Thirdly, the shared understandings of a community can 
become normative in the sense that its members may feel a sense of obligation 
towards the communal norms. The field of legal pluralism developed as a response 
to the recognition that the state is not the only community whose norms are 
obligatory.12 
Where the state uses force and other instrumentalities to ensure obedience to its 
laws, it is often a combination of force, habit and other sanctions that ensures the 
acquiescence of members of non-state entities within a state. Every state therefore 
confronts the challenge of reconciling political citizenship with cultural identities. A 
significant part of this challenge is the extent to which a state would recognise a 
cultural identity as worthy of protection, thereby accepting the need for a politics of 
difference. Without the recognition of difference in the cultural life of citizens, their 
identities would be subsumed under dominant identities. 
States approach the reconciliation of the cultural identities of their citizens in many 
different ways. One way in which liberal democratic states reconcile the tension of 
cultural identities and political citizenship is through the medium of human rights. 
The Bill of Rights recognises the cultural identities chosen by citizens either from the 
circumstances of their birth or by their conscious efforts. Accordingly, many 
constitutions recognise membership of cultural, religious and linguistic communities 
                                                          
12 See for example Griffiths 1986 J Legal Plur 1-55. 
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in addition to recognising the right of citizens to choose any culture of their choice. 
These two broad mechanisms promote cultural identities, since they protect the 
differences between individuals under the banner of the equality of political 
citizenship. 
The challenge of protecting cultural identities in a modern liberal democracy such as 
South Africa is how to reconcile liberal multiculturalism, which allows the individual a 
choice in his sub-national identities, and illiberal multiculturalism, which categorises 
and classifies individuals into sub-national cultural identities on the basis of 
antecedent facts such as the circumstances of their birth and obliges each individual 
to live within such a preordained category.13 As stated above, this article examines 
the extent to which the South African legal system recognises the promises of 
section 30 of the Constitution of an individual choice in cultural matters as a means 
of resolving the tension between political citizenship and cultural identities. Since the 
focus of the article is directed at the normative systems of communities, the next 
part of the article turns to a consideration of communities and their customary law, 
as the foundation required to facilitate a discussion (in part four of the article) of 
how South African citizens acquire and possibly change the particular customary law 
to which they subscribe. 
3 Communities and customary law in South Africa 
This part of the article examines the application of customary law as the normative 
framework of communities. Since section 31 of the Constitution recognises cultural, 
religious and linguistic communities,14 it is important to determine whether or not the 
normative systems of these communities are also recognised. Assuming for the sake 
of argument that they are so recognised, how do we describe these normative 
frameworks? Even though for the purposes of this article the term customary law is 
defined as the normative systems of communities, it is clear that the tem "customary 
                                                          
13  See Bekker and Leildé 2003 IJMS 121. 
14 The recognition of communal rights is in the context of individual rights since s 31(1) of the 
Constitution provides that "Persons belonging to a cultural religious or linguistic community may 
not be denied the right, with other members of that community to (a) to enjoy their culture 
practice their religion and use their language and (b) to form join and maintain cultural religious 
and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society." See Nkosi v Bührmann 2001 1 SA 
372 (SCA). 
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law" has a technical sense defined by South Africa's historical realities. Even though 
the Constitution recognises customary law as a normative system through the 
provisions of section 211(3),15 it is also clear that there is no textual connection in 
the definition of customary law to the communities recognised in section 31(1). 
It is plausible to argue that South Africa's socio-economic history is the reason why 
considerable academic and judicial opinion in South Africa associate customary law 
with black communities. For example, in wondering whether customary law applies 
to people other than indigenous Africans Moseneke DCJ in Gumede v President of 
the Republic of South Africa16 expressed a reality of the South African legal system in 
saying that only black South Africans are entitled to customary law. It is to be 
remembered that an early legal connection of customary law with black people is 
made in the definition of indigenous law in the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
1988, which in section 1(4) defines indigenous law as "the law of custom as applied 
by Black tribes in South Africa". On the other hand, section 1(1) of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 in which "indigenous law" is mentioned, 
provides that any court may take judicial notice of indigenous law. Reacting to this 
provision Professor Kerr believes that it omits the requirement that both parties to 
the case must be black South Africans if customary law is to apply.17 The reference 
to "black people" has been thought to be objectionable,18 but the change of 
descriptor of "black" to "indigenous African" or "indigenous people" in later 
legislation nevertheless clearly refers to black people19 and deepens the belief that 
customary law is exclusively meant for black communities. 
                                                          
15 S 211(3) of the Constitution provides that "The Courts must apply customary law when that law 
is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary 
law." 
16 Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC) para 34: "Difficult 
questions may surface about the reach of customary law, whom it binds and, in particular, 
whether people other than indigenous African people may be bound by customary law." 
17 See Kerr 1989 SALJ 166, 168; Himonga and Bosch 2000 SALJ 306, 307; Pieterse 2001 SAJHR 
364, 380-381. 
18 See Bekker and Rautenbach "Nature and Sphere of Application" 18: "This definition still appears 
in statute books, but it should be clear that its reference to race is objectionable and therefore it 
should be scrapped or changed to reflect the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom." 
19 This point is also recognised by Bekker and Rautenbach "Nature and Sphere of Application" 18: 
"It is generally accepted that 'indigenous African peoples' refers to the black population only." 
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First, the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act20 defines customary law as "the 
customs and usages traditionally observed among indigenous African Peoples of 
South Africa and which form part of the culture of those peoples." Secondly, the 
Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act21 
also defines "customary law" as "the customs and practices observed among 
indigenous African people of South Africa which form part of the Culture of those 
people". Bekker and Koyana comment on the latter definition as follows: 
The phrase seems to confine the operation of the law to South African Africans. By 
implication it excludes persons who are non-Africans and other people of mixed 
origin who have entered into customary marriages … [O]ne may ask: Who are the 
indigenous people of South Africa? According to anthropologists the only true 
indigenous people of South Africa are the Khoi-San.22 
Bekker and Rautenbach also say: 
It may be argued that to regard white people (Europeans) as intruders in South 
Africa and Africans as indigenous to South Africa is erroneous .… The history books 
show us that the original inhabitants of South Africa are the Khoi and San people, 
but the other African people are the offspring of immigrants from the north of Africa 
(at least north of Zambezi) .… The Africans and Europeans were more or less 
simultaneous immigrants .…23 
Even though considerable evidence points to the fact that customary law applies to 
black people as a result of practice24 and popular belief there is no conclusive proof 
in reality that customary law applies only to black people. Since the Constitution 
contemplates the existence of various cultural, religious and linguistic communities25 
black communities may be part of one or all of these communities. It therefore 
follows that the normative systems of all of these communities are equally as 
deserving of protection as, the customary law of black people. 
It is important at this point to explore how the normative frameworks of the 
constitutionally recognised communities have been recognised, articulated or 
elaborated, with the caution that language and religion are often integral parts of 
                                                          
20 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
21 Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. 
22 See Bekker and Koyana 2012 De Jure 574. 
23 See Bekker and Rautenbach "Nature and Sphere of Application" 19. 
24 See Pieterse 2001 SAJHR 381. 
25 See Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 7578 (CC) (hereafter 
referred to as Christian Education). 
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communities. Let us start with the religious communities recognised by a composite 
reading of sections 15(1)26 and 31 of the Constitution and affirmed in a number of 
cases. In MEC for Education KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay27 the Court recognised the 
customs of a South Indian Tamil and Hindu community in KwaZulu-Natal. In Hay v 
B28 the practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses community were in issue. In Prince v 
President, Cape Law Society29 the practices of the Rastafarian community were in 
issue. It is important to point out that in these cases and others,30 religious 
communities urged South African courts to uphold the practices that constitute part 
of their normative framework, even though these norms are not described as 
customary law. Thus in Taylor v Kurstag31 the High Court upheld a Jewish 
Ecclesiastical Court excommunication order. The recognition of the normative 
autonomy of religious associations was affirmed in De Lange v The Presiding Bishop 
of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa,32 where the Supreme Court of Appeal 
affirmed the reluctance of courts to adjudicate doctrinal disputes. In the opinion of 
the Court, disputes about the internal rules of a church should as far as possible be 
left to the church, to be determined domestically and without interference from a 
court.33 In a telling opinion the Court declared that: 
High court judgments such as Taylor v Kurtstag and Wittmann v Deutsche 
Schulverein, Pretoria 1998 4 SA 423 (T) appear to accept that individuals who 
voluntarily commit themselves to a religious association's rules and decision-making 
bodies should be prepared to accept the outcome of fair hearings conducted by 
those bodies.34 
Clearly the reference to a religious association's rules and decision-making bodies 
pertains to its normative structure. 
                                                          
26 S 15(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to freedom of conscience religion 
thought belief and opinion. 
27 MEC for Education KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC). 
28 Hay v B 2003 3 SA 628 (T). 
29 Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 2 SA 794 (CC). 
30 See for example Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente, Moreleta Park 2009 4 SA 510 
(EqC). 
31 Taylor v Kurstag 2005 1 SA 362 (W). See generally Woolman and Zeffertt 2012 SAJHR 196. Also 
see Wittmann v Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria 1998 4 SA 423 (T); Mohammed v Jassiem 1996 
1 SA 673 (A). 
32 De Lange v The Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa 2014 ZASCA 151 
(29 September 2014) (hereafter referred to as De Lange). 
33 De Lange para 39. 
34 De Lange para 40. 
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The clear recognition of religious communities appears far more settled than that of 
linguistic communities, even in the face of the constitutional recognition of eleven 
languages.35 Currie and de Waal argue, for example, that speakers of the Afrikaans 
language: 
... share an important characteristic, but whether the nature of their relationship 
with each other is sufficient to constitute a community is not clear. Afrikaans 
speakers do not know each other personally, do not systematically interact with 
each other and are divided in any number of significant ways such as race class and 
political affiliation.36 
It is to be remembered that many of the constitutionally recognised languages form 
an integral part of the black communities that are recognised as being entitled to 
customary law. It is not far-fetched to argue that the Afrikaans people are a 
community in terms of section 31 of the Constitution, and that their normative 
framework, irrespective of the difficulty in its ascertainment and proof, ought to be 
recognised within the framework of the South African legal system, even though it is 
of course plausible that this normative framework approximates to the South African 
common law. In the same vein the South African Chinese community represents a 
community whose normative system deserves recognition. 
The term "cultural" appears to have been deliberately inserted as a substitute for the 
term "ethnic" in section 31 of the Constitution,37 and could be the basis of the 
recognition of the normative systems of black communities. Since the definition of 
culture encompasses the totality of a group's experience, culture comprises more 
than religion and language and is therefore an appropriate description of black 
communities, especially where culture, religion and language are used conjunctively. 
On the other hand it would seem that a broad and disjunctive interpretation of 
section 31 would focus on the varied meaning of culture and recognise that the 
Constitution envisages communities organised on other social bases that are not 
language and religion but are yet a reflection of a common intention. 
                                                          
35 See s 6 of the Constitution. 
36 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 629. 
37 See Christian Education para 23. 
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An understanding of socialisation and common interest as the basis of a community 
enables us to appreciate individual choice as a possible basis of membership of a 
community. We are also enabled to rethink the term "cultural communities" as 
representing a group of persons with a common interest forged in their interaction 
with their physical and social environment. We would also understand that culture is 
constantly evolving as a result of this interaction and is not immutable or static. 
Section 30 of the Constitution implicitly recognises that individual choice constitutes 
the common interest that is important in the sustenance of communities. 
4 Acquisition and change of customary law in South Africa 
The last section demonstrated the fact that the Constitution as interpreted by the 
courts recognises at the least cultural, religious and linguistic communities as well as 
their normative orders, whether described as customary law or otherwise. This 
section of the article examines how ordinary citizens acquire and change their 
normative orders. It addresses the divide between the notion that South Africans are 
what their ancestors are the constitutional provision that South Africans may choose 
their normative orders. 
The manner in which South Africans become members of a community seems linked 
to their antecedents and their continuing intention. Currie and de Waal write that: 
… to prove membership of a cultural religious or linguistic community some 
concrete tie of affinity must be proved to exist between the individual and his 
community .… A person belongs to one of section 31's communities because that 
person has historical associations with the community and has chosen to maintain 
those associations.38 
It is possible, however, that the historical association in question refers to the 
circumstances of birth and upbringing through which children's cultural identities are 
established. In many other cases the cultural identities of parents are passed on to 
their children just as citizenship is also determined by birth.39 Birth and blood 
descent determine ethnic affiliations, essentially foreclosing for many people the 
possibility of changing their ethnic affiliations. 
                                                          
38 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 630. 
39 See s 2 of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. 
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Since section 30 of the Constitution provides a choice of normative orders it is 
important to ask if the use of the word "participate" connotes a legal consequence or 
a sense of non-obligatory and everyday engagement in popular culture, such as 
listening to music, reading a book or watching a film. The use of "participate" rather 
than "choose" seems to convey the latter meaning. Academic and judicial opinion 
urges the former meaning. For example, Bennett rightly argues that, to the extent 
that individuals are free to participate in the culture of their choice, they have a right 
to demand admission to the cultural group, so that they may engage in its 
activities.40 In Mthembu v Letsela41 the Court stated that section 31 enables persons 
desirous of doing so to choose a particular system of customary law. In this way it is 
possible that some legal consequence would on its own or cumulatively indicate a 
choice of "customary law" if a citizen speaks a particular language. Even though it is 
interesting to note that there is no mention of religion in section 30, it would be 
startling to argue that no legal consequences ensue by joining or exiting a religious 
organisation. Individual choice is often manifested in the manner in which citizens 
experience their daily lives. Accordingly, Bekker and Rautenbach urge that "Presently 
with emphasis on culture of choice it may be said that adopting the ways of life of an 
African would be a yardstick to test whether Customary Law is applicable or not".42 
Ngcobo J in Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human 
Rights Commission v President of South Africa43 listed a number of factors to 
determine the choice of law which even though seemingly directed at transactional 
disputes seem appropriate for affiliation to customary law. According to him: 
The determination of the choice of law which regulates the circumstances in which 
indigenous law is applicable involves policy decisions. In particular, it involves a 
decision on the criteria for determining when indigenous law is applicable. There is 
a range of options in this regard. The choice of law may be based on, among other 
things, agreement, the lifestyle of individuals, the type of marriage, the nature of 
the property such as family land, justice and equity, or a combination of all these 
factors. 
                                                          
40 Bennett Customary Law 87. 
41 Mthembu v Letsela 1997 2 SA 936 (T). 
42 Bekker and Rautenbach "Nature and Sphere of Application" 23. 
43 Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC). 
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In this regard it is to be remembered that section 1(3) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act, when identifying the choice of laws between Blacks who are not of 
the same tribe, puts their agreement as the general rule. It is difficult to separate 
choice from agreement to be bound by a customary law, which as a product of 
deliberation indicates a choice made by one or both of the parties. Assuming two 
Zulu men agree to be bound by Sotho customary law in a transaction, would it be 
right to hold that Sotho law is inapplicable because the parties are Zulu, as 
determined by birth? Such a holding would be unconstitutional, since it would deny 
the parties the right to participate in a culture of their choice. The same 
consideration would apply where a lifestyle reveals a choice to be bound (or to 
choose) a particular customary law.  
Even though the proposed Application of Customary Law Bill drafted as part of the 
South African Law Commission Report on the Harmonisation of the Common Law 
and Indigenous Law defines customary law in terms of indigenous African peoples of 
the Republic44 [aka black people], a schema is listed to govern the application of 
customary law, which relies first on the express or implied agreement between the 
parties, unless the court is satisfied that it is inappropriate to do so. In the absence 
of such an agreement the next factor is the law with which the parties or issues have 
the closest connection. To determine this law, relevant factors include the nature, 
form and purpose of any transaction between the parties; the place where the cause 
of action arose; the parties' way of life and, for the purposes of determining interests 
in land, the place where that land is situated. Accordingly, an African can change his 
customary law to another customary law and potentially can also abandon a 
customary law. The question is what does he or she abandon customary law in 
favour of? In many respects it is the common law that will be a natural destination of 
a black person who seeks to change his customary law. A good example would be 
contracting a statutory marriage or making a will. 
It would appear that choice in religion is more pronounced than for other cultural 
identities, because it appears easier to make such a choice. Thus in Kotze v Kotze45 
                                                          
44 S 1 of the Draft Bill in SALC Project 90. 
45 Kotze v Kotze 2003 3 SA 628 (T). 
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the court refused to sanction a settlement agreement between parties to a divorce 
that stipulated that the child would participate in all activities of the Apostolic Church 
on the grounds that a reading of section 15 and 18 of the Constitution requires the 
voluntary participation in religious activity, and therefore an agreement that compels 
a child to participate in a stated religion would infringe the child's right to freedom of 
religion. In effect, Kotze implies that a religious choice made by a child is in the best 
interest of the child irrespective of the maturity of the child.46 Whatever misgivings 
exist with respect to Kotze, for our purposes it is necessary to note that it affirms 
section 30 of the Constitution. It is the possibility of change and the appropriation of 
a new religious identity that respects the dignity and autonomy of South Africans. 
For example, the ability to change religions confronts certain theological objections 
to change and the characterization of such change as apostasy.47 Without the 
possibility of participating in a religion of their choice, citizens would be bound to the 
decisions of their parents. 
It is also important to stress that the right to join one's culture of choice is 
dependent on the community rules about who may join, as we have seen in respect 
of religious association. Thus, a community may seek to restrict membership and/or 
ensure that its core beliefs are maintained. It is well to remember that the internal 
provisos in section 30 and 31 require the exercise of these rights to be consistent 
with other provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
The next part of the article turns to a consideration of two issues that provide 
significant illustrations of the possibility of the acquisition of new customary law. 
  
                                                          
46 See Robinson 2004 TSAR 202-208. It is to be noted that article 14 of the United Nations 
Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989) provides that all children have the right to think and 
believe what they want and also to practise their religion, as long as they are not stopping other 
people from enjoying their rights. The section further provides that Governments must respect 
the rights of parents to give their children guidance about this right in a manner consistent with 
the evolving capacities of the child. It is argued by Prof Robinson that international law 
recognizes the maturity of a child as a key part of the exercise of the right to religion.  
47 See Lerner 1998 Emory Int'l LR 477-562. 
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5 Customary marriages and succession in South Africa 
5.1 Customary marriages 
This section of the article explores the issue of customary marriages as an instance 
in which cultural identity in South Africa is immutable. It would appear that a 
significant challenge for customary marriages is the possibility of non-black South 
Africans contracting customary marriages, which arises from the definition of 
"customary law" and "customary marriage" in the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act. A customary marriage is defined as "a marriage conducted in 
accordance with customary law, and customary law is defined as customs and 
usages traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa 
and which form part of the culture of those peoples". It would appear, therefore, 
from a combined reading of the two definitions, that only black (indigenous) people 
can contract a customary marriage. The requirement by section 3(1)b of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act that the marriage must be negotiated and 
entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law strengthens the point 
that only black South Africans are conceived as capable of contracting customary 
marriages. Without going into the merits or otherwise of a customary marriage, it 
would appear that non-black South Africans in apparent customary marriages are in 
invalid unions. Bekker and Koyana point to the significance of this issue when they 
draw attention to the effect of proving that a party to a marriage is not an 
indigenous person.48 
5.2 Testate succession and customary law 
Given the widespread acknowledgement of the freedom of testation,49 even under 
the Constitution,50 it would be strange were it to be said that a white South African 
could not choose specific parts of any black customary law as a basis of 
testamentary disposition. The essence of the freedom of testamentary disposition is 
                                                          
48 See Bekker and Koyana 2012 De Jure 575. 
49 See for example Jamneck "Freedom of Testation" 115; Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd v Estate Nathan 
1940 AD 163. 
50 See De Waal "Law of Succession" 3G1-3G15; Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd 2006 4 SA 
205 (C). 
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a good example of the freedom to choose contemplated in section 30 of the 
Constitution. Even though it would appear that the customary law of succession has 
been substantially replaced with the common law of succession as a result of the 
judgment in Bhe and the Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation 
of Related Matters Act, it would appear that section 2(1) of that Act preserves, as 
Rautenbach argues,51 certain parts of the customary law of succession because of 
the cast of that section: 
The estate or part of the estate of any person who is subject to customary law who 
dies after the commencement of this Act and whose estate does not devolve in 
terms of that person's will, must devolve in accordance with the law of intestate 
succession …. 
A necessary and appropriate question is whether a non-Black South African would be 
without the capacity to bequeath his or her property in accordance with the rules of 
customary law. As Bennett52 recognises, while clear testamentary dispositions would 
pose no problem, the same cannot be said of value laden dispositions that clearly 
import customary law rules or require an interpretation based on customary law. 
How would we approach a bequest by a white South African requiring his son to 
undergo Xhosa initiation rites as a condition for claiming a gift? Would such a 
bequest be bad on a general basis, or on the specific basis that white South Africans 
cannot partake of Xhosa customary law and its initiation rites?53 In this regard, the 
extensive consideration by Rautenbach54 of the possibility that the principle of male 
primogeniture could be valid in a will could certainly be relevant for all South 
Africans. If a black South African can incorporate the principle of primogeniture into 
a will, there is no reason why other South Africans cannot do the same. 
To sum up this part, it appears that the promise of choice in section 30 of the 
Constitution has not significantly guided legislation such as the Reform of the 
Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 
                                                          
51 Rautenbach 2014 Acta Juridica 132-159. 
52 Bennett Customary Law 60-61. 
53 There are media reports of white South Africans engaged in initiation rights: IOL News 2007 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/white-teen-joins-frien-for-xhosa-ritual-
1.381376#.VDVxLBZYVmw; BBC News Africa 2013 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
23284898. 
54 Rautenbach 2014 Acta Juridica 132-159. 
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since it appears that only black South Africans can engage in a customary marriage. 
In another perspective it is evident that section 30 of the Constitution would support 
the freedom of testamentary disposition and allow South Africans the freedom to 
choose constitutionally permissible rules of customary law. 
6 Concluding remarks 
It is the possibility of changing one's choice of a system of customary law that 
emancipates customary law from the significant challenge of racism so ably 
articulated by Pieterse, who argues that the Consitution's provisions for legal dualism 
and support for customary law could lead to a violation of the right to equality due to 
customary law's racialist foundations and its general consequences.55 Even though 
his argument is directed at the inferior status of customary law, it has significance 
for the right of non-Black South Africans to become affiliated to a customary law. If 
one's racial status denies one the right to participate in a culture, that denial is 
certainly racist. 
The consequences of making customary law immutable would include the 
reinforcement of fixed identities, exclusivities and discrimination. A customary law 
that is reserved for black people only would encourage a discrimination that 
identified different classes of South Africans, even if unwittingly. We are witnesses to 
the emergence of a "native" group which appears to be based on race and which is 
itself based on the differentiation offered by a number of devices, including 
customary law.56 Of more significance is the fact that fixed cultural identities fostered 
by an immutable customary law lay waste to the concept of citizenship. A truly non-
racial South African citizenship would recognise sub-national identities, because 
section 30 of the Constitution allows citizens to choose a normative framework of 
cultural, religious and linguistic communities if they so wish. What appears to be 
absent is the realisation that black people are not exclusively entitled to customary 
law. Other communities are entitled to their "customary law", just as black South 
Africans are entitled to opt for any customary law of their choice. 
                                                          
55 See Pieterse 2001 SAJHR 380. 
56 See for example Mamdani Citizen and Subject; Mamdani "When Does a Settler Become a 
Native?". 
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Realizing this constitutional provision would be to create a credible path to national 
integration and away from the Apartheid past. Individual choice would consign sub-
national identities to the private realm and significantly reduce or eliminate the 
involvement of the State in determining and using sub national identities. 
The impact of the voluntary appropriation of sub national identities such as 
customary law would not have a significant impact on the public sector, so that there 
would be no need to determine that a Chinese person was actually black. 
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